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Since 2015 Iraq has been experiencing an unprecedented movement of
popular protests that is mobilising a whole generation of its youth,
demanding a radical change of regime. Based on recent  eldwork with
women, civil society and youth organisations and networks, I explore
the Iraqi protests in the light of new theorisations of contemporary civil
society and social movements. What I  nd is that the notion of
madaniyya claimed by Iraqi protesters is not only an expression of a
‘post-Islamist’ political moment but it is structured by the traumatic
experience of sectarian violence. For Iraqi youth, the demands for social
justice and economic redistribution cannot be separated from the claim
for sectarian equality and religious freedom: both demands are
experienced as matters of life and death.
A new civil society?
My research engages with Gready and Robins’ concept of a ‘new civil
society’ and Islah Jad’s critique of the ‘NGOization’ of social
movements in the Arab region. For them, conceptions of civil society
are often reduced to the human rights NGOs’ understanding of
transitional justice in theory and practice. If civil society is understood
as the sphere outside of the state and the economic market, for Gready
and Robins, the difference between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ civil society
lies in the relationship to the state and its institutions: ‘old civil society’
privileges advocacy, support and capacity building, with the state and
state institutions as the main point of reference while ‘new civil society’
insists on autonomy and independence from the state. The ‘new civil
society’ refers to forms of actions and protests, and in the Iraqi case
this is manifested through a rejection of sectarianism and identity-
based politics.
Earlier protests took place in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square in 2011 in the
context of the Arab Spring, and the Iraqi protests of 2015 carried
transformative and in uential dimensions. Demonstrations started from
tens of thousands of protesters in July 2015, carrying on every Friday to
reach almost one million. Under slogans such as Bis mil-din baguna al-
haramiya -in the name of religion we were robbed by looters- protesters
denounced the ethno-sectarian political system established through the
US invasion and occupation of 2003. They question the entire religious
political elite, and denounce institutionalised and generalised
corruption, the lack of basic services such as electricity, water, the
absence of functioning health and education infrastructures as well as
endemic unemployment. Protests spread all over the country and
continued for over  ve months with actions such as sit-ins at the
entrance of Baghdad’s Green Zone and Iraqi Parliament.
The 2015 Iraqi protest movement was launched by young male
individuals under the age of 30 years old, educated, belonging to the
lower middle class and middle class – mainly educators, teachers or
state employees. However, the individuals who took leadership of the
movement belong to the older generation, mainly men with former
activist experience and a liated with civil society or political
organisations, such as the Iraqi Communist Party. Ali Taher Al-Hamoud
argues convincingly that the 2015 protest are the protest of a middle
class seeking to assert itself after decades of silence. The end of the
UN sanctions in 2003 saw the re-emergence of this class previously
destroyed by the economic crisis and successive wars.
The 2015 protests echo the growing gap between the political elite and
the rest of the Iraqi population. The Iraqi ‘political street’, to use Asef
Bayat’s notion, sees the political elite as sectarian, corrupt and
responsible for sectarian violence and  the lack of state’s services. The
core of the protesters grew up in the sectarian war and in a country
lacking basic infrastructure and services, and in which the state’s
institutions are structured by corruption and nepotism. Islamism and
identity-based political formation are rejected all together. This is clear
in the movement’s main slogan denouncing not only the Islamist
political elite and its corruption, but also both the importance religion
holds in Iraq’s everyday life since 2003.Through the notion of
madaniyya which could be translated as ‘civicness’, protesters reject the
Islamisation and the sectarianisation of social and political life and
demand a functioning welfare state redistributing Iraqi wealth to its
citizens.
The protests are the most visible side of a wider range of social and
political initiatives mushrooming in the country that open social and
political spaces and practices outside of the sphere of the NGOs and
composes a ‘new civil society’. From initiatives such as organising a
Valentine’s Day celebration in Tahrir Square to foster love in peace-
building, to the campaign Ana Iraqi Ana Aqraa -I am Iraqi and I read-
placing books on sidewalks and parks to promote a ‘culture of reading’,
a high level of creativity and originality have characterised these new
forms of activism developed among young educated Iraqis since 2011.
Most of the young individuals who launched these initiatives then
participated in the 2015 protests and insist on developing a
consciousness led by a rejection of sectarian violence and politics and
the defence of freedom of thinking.
During my  eldwork and interviews with young protesters, I observed an
important generational gap between the activists born in the late 1990s
and the ones born before this period. The younger the individuals, the
more radical they were in their demand for change and their rejection of
the political elite and system. Expression of a ‘Saddam nostalgia’ is
even noticeable among the generation under 30 years old who never
experienced life under the authoritarian regime, as also pointed out by
Marsin Alshamary.
The main controversy that divided activists and protesters in Baghdad’s
Tahrir Square during the 2015 protest is the involvement of the
conservative Islamist Shi‘a Sadrist movement, some accusing the
Sadrists of co-opting the movement, others considering their
participation as a way to involve their wide working-class base in the
movement. Some women’s rights activists view the Sadrist involvement
with pragmatism describing it as a way to spread ideas of madaniyya to
the proletarian Sadrist base. Others are very critical of the lack of clear
feminist demands in the protest and reject the participation of the
Sadrists describing them as sectarian, religious and conservative. Many
feminist activists criticise the 2015 movement for accommodating the
Shi‘a Islamist movement in their choice for ‘civil’ and ‘nationalist’ type of
demands rather than ‘secular’ and ‘leftist’.
More recently, in July 2018 protests erupted again from the oil-rich
province of Basra and spread in the Shi‘a South. Composed
predominantly of young men, its slogans are clear and go beyond the
call for functioning state services through slogans such as “There is no
watan (homeland)!” and “No, no, no to parties!”.
From recognition to redistribution?
For Fraser, demands for redistribution correspond to the addressing of
socioeconomic injustices rooted in the political and economic structure
of a society (exploitation, deprivation and economic marginalisation)
while claims for recognition tackle symbolic or ‘cultural’ injustice, rooted
in patterns of representation, interpretation and communication. Fraser
considers that the intersection of class, race and gender, for example,
are both socioeconomic and symbolic and that class, race and gender
justice requires both redistribution and recognition. Her attempt to
examine the relationship between them and her critical examination of
the analytical ‘redistribution-recognition dilemma’ is interesting in our
exploration of today’s political and social mobilisations in Iraq.
It is clear that the occupation administration along with the new Iraqi
elite politics have been dominated by a recognition paradigm, in the
sense that prefabricated ethno-sectarian identity politics have been
imposed from the top and institutionalised. The protest movements
reject this. Instead, they are  putting forward what Faleh A. Jabar calls
‘issue politics’ dominated by a redistribution paradigm. While the
context following the invasion and occupation of Iraq is clearly
characterised by the institutionalisation of identity politics through the
muhasasa system that determines political representation based on
communal identities -religious, ethnic or sectarian; it is equally
important to analyse identity politics as changing and dynamic.
Moreover, these recent protest movements are intra-sectarian, their
main actors are mainly Shi‘a citizens protesting against the Shi‘a
political elite.
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So beyond the redistribution-recognition dilemma, my research shows
that the polarisation between the elite and the people needs to be
analysed by looking at neo-liberal economic politics (privatisation, job
crisis etc.), the political economy of war (militia-sation, militarisation
etc.), and the ‘toxicity of everyday life’, that I would de ne here as the
structural conditions of everyday life and livelihood such as health and
sanitary infrastructures and environmental conditions.
Basra’s recent protests have not been echoed in the Sunni provinces,
many of which have been destroyed in the course of the numerous
military battles from 2003 and the war against the Islamic State in
Mosul. As pointed out by the researcher Safaa Khalaf, their millions of
inhabitants, either living in camps or in terrible conditions fear the
stigmatisation of being associated with ‘terrorism’ or members of the
Islamic State and state repression. Additionally, the protest movement
has not been followed in Iraqi Kurdistan despite the economic crisis in
which it is plunged. In its structure, demands and reach, the movement
represents a shift from ‘recognition politics’ that is associated with the
system backed by the political elite to redistribution politics. Basra’s
dramatic social, economic and sanitary crisis epitomised the structural
dysfunction of the post-2003 Iraqi political system depriving its citizen
from its very rich oil resources.
If the 2015 movement could be deemed as characteristic of a ‘new civil
society’, the speci cities of the Iraqi context structured by political and
sectarian violence make the rejection of identity politics, especially
sectarian identity and religion, central. For Iraqi protesters individual
freedom, especially the freedom not to belong to a religious and
sectarian group is considered as essential as economic equality. The
madaniyya claimed by Iraqi youth is not only the ‘post-Islamist’ moment
spreading throughout the region over the last decade. Instead, it is
characterised by the traumatic experience of sectarian violence that the
invasion of the Islamic State only further exacerbated. Thus, for Iraqi
youth being free to not believe in religion or belong to a sect is as
important as being free from poverty: both are lived as matters of life
and death.
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